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Introduction 
 
By many standards, Mexico is a surprisingly strong economy. In terms of total GDP, the 
combination of a population of 100 million and a per capita GDP exceeding US$5,000, 
makes Mexico the ninth largest economy in the world. With US$232 Bn in trade for 2002, 
it is the US´s second trading partner (behind Canada), and far ahead from the third 
trading partner (Japan with US$184 Bn). This could be considered surprising for a 
country that is often thought of as a “developing” country.  
 
Export figures are even more impressive when we consider the country’s economic 
history in the last fifty years. From the 1950s to the early 1980s Mexico followed a strict 
import substitution policy; high tariffs were levied on most products, based on a policy of 
protection for infant industries. Regulations were also imposed on foreign investment 
and ownership in order to insure the development of Mexican-owned industry. After a 
severe economic crisis in the early eighties, the government recognized the need for 
stabilization and structural change; by 1985, it unilaterally dropped requirements for 
import permits on most products, and a year later joined GATT, decreasing tariff and 
non-tariff barriers for most products. This liberalization strategy was continued, most 
importantly through the signing of 11 free trade agreements, which include 32 countries. 
These agreements include: the European Union, the European Free Trade Area, several 
Latin American Countries, and, most importantly, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). 
 
NAFTA created many opportunities for Mexico, both in terms of fostering domestic 
industry, and attracting international firms. The main achievement was a substantial 
increase in exports, and a change in industrial structure from petroleum to manufacturing 
products.  
 
Most of the exports are based on firms taking advantage of the country’s proximity and 
labour cost differences with the U.S. However, this model of growth is starting to show 
severe limitations. For example the Maquiladoras2, which showed annual labour force 
increases for 37 straight years, reached its maximum level of employment of 1.35 million 
in early 2002, and shed over 21% of its workforce in 15 months. In terms of number of 
plants, 545 (15% of total) closed in the 8 month period following June 2001. Similarly, 
the “star” sector of NAFTA, the automotive industry, shed several thousand jobs in 2002. 
 
                                                
1 Many ideas presented in this paper were developed while producing inputs for the Mexico document of the 
Knowledge for Development (K4D) program of the World Bank and resulted from suggestions and continued 
discussion with Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Carl Dahlmann.  
2 Refers to firms performing in-bond operations, paying export duties only on the valued added inside the 
firm. 
This could easily be dismissed as part of an adjustment caused by the contraction of the 
US economy. If these were definitive closures, they could be attributed to market 
conditions; however, this unfortunately seems not to be the case. An estimated 34% of 
the Maquiladoras which left the country did not disappear, but went to Asian countries, 
mostly China (Consejo Nacional de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportación, 2003). 
Similarly, while Daimler-Chrysler closed 3 plants in 2002, and shed over 2000 jobs, 
company executives have expressed intention of building a new plant in the North 
American region, with an investment of US$400 to US$600 million, reflecting a loss in 
relative competitiveness. 
 
Both government and industry leaders are extremely concerned about Asian countries 
attracting assembly firms. This concern was clearly reflected when Mexico was the last 
country to accept China´s inclusion in the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, 
these leaders seem to understand the competitiveness problem as one arising from 
differences in labour cost, ignoring the close relation between a country’s performance 
and its technological capabilities (in a broad sense which includes adoption, adaptation 
and creation). Failure to recognize this critical link will result in further loss of 
competitiveness.  
 
The objective of this paper is to relate the outstanding export performance with other 
economic variables. The main argument is that the missing link between trade 
liberalization and high growth rates, has been the absence of innovation from firms. This 
hypothesis builds on a growing body of research which shows the relationship of the 
capacity to innovate, particularly in the private sector, with economic growth and 
productivity improvements. This means that constant underinvestment in R&D, rather 
than just being a problem resulting in low levels of innovation output (such as patenting) 
is a barrier to achieving sustained economic growth.  
 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The first section describes the 
evolution of export and productivity, showing that the extraordinary increase in exports 
has not been reflected in increased firm efficiency. The second section describes the 
innovation system in Mexico, and the inherent weaknesses of the system. The third 
section describes industrial development and innovation policies pursued in the last ten 
years, including the more recent attempts to link these two policies. The final section 
presents conclusions and recommendations on how to strengthen the innovation system 
in the near future.  
 
 
 
Evolution of exports and productivity 
 
The efforts by the Mexican government to liberalize trade have resulted in a dramatic 
transformation of both the quantity and structure of trade. In terms of quantity, exports 
have increased eight-fold, from 20 to 160 US$Bn, and imports have increased over 10 
times, from 14.5 to 170 US$Bn. (See Figure 1). Currently, exports represent over 30% of 
GDP. Perhaps more importantly, the increase in exports is a result of a profound 
transformation in the structure of trade, with a major shift from oil-related to 
manufacturing exports. In 1985, petroleum accounted for 68% of total exports, while 
manufacturing was just 23%. Since 1998, manufacturing has accounted for 87 % to 90%, 
while petroleum related products have only been between 6% and 10%.  (see Figure  2).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Growth of Imports and Exports 
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Figure  2. Structure of Exports 
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Within manufacturing exports, the products have also increased in complexity. Using the 
OECD classification, high-tech products accounted for 26.9% of total exports in 1999, up 
from 7.0% in 1990. Table 1 shows the quantities exported of different high-tech goods. 
High-tech and medium-high-tech industries constitute 74.1% of total exports, higher than 
countries such as Germany and United Kingdom, and 11.6% higher than the OECD 
average.3 
 
Table 1. Exports of Technology Equipment by Trade Regime 
US$ billion, 2001 
 
Non-Maquila Maquila Temporal Total
Aeronautical 144 280 750 1,173
Computers and Office Machinery 225 8,020 4,751 12,996
Electronics 242 13,380 769 14,391
Pharmaceutical 588 17 322 926
Scientific Instruments 70 1,230 743 2,044
Electrical Machinery 63 1,799 200 2,061
Chemical 111 2 194 313
Non-Electrical Machinery 18 4 18 40
Weapons 4 5 14 22
Total 1,464 24,736 7,760 33,965  
 Source: Conacyt (2002) 
 
 
Other achievements of the Mexican economy, which can at least be partially attributed to 
its trade liberalization strategy, include a more decentralized regional structure, with 
economic activity moving away from the Mexico City region to the center and north of 
the country, and a reasonably stable macroeconomic environment since 1996.  
 
This growth in manufacturing exports seems to reflect a transformation of the economy, 
where firms have improved their operations, allowing them to be competitive in the world 
market. This story is partly true, for some firms have been successful in absorbing 
technology and translating it into increased output and exports. However, a closer look 
shows that, despite this good performance in terms of exports, there are underlying 
vulnerabilities in the system. Three factors can give us a more accurate picture of this 
performance: growth, total factor productivity (TFP) and export composition. These are 
explained below. 
 
 
 
 
i.  Growth Performance 
 
Despite the huge increase in exports, economic growth has been rather mediocre since 
1982. Table 2 shows the evolution of per capita GDP growth in Mexico for the last four 
decades. We can observe that during the 1980s (commonly called Latin America´s lost 
decade), per capita GDP growth was negative. Despite the major liberalization efforts 
taking place after 1985, average annual per capita growth rate in the 1990s was still less 
than half the growth achieved during the 1960s and 1970s.  
                                                
3 The classification used for technology intensity of export is the one defined by the OECD. High-tech goods 
include: aircraft and spacecraft, pharmaceuticals, Office, accounting and computing machinery, radio, 
television and communication equipment, and medical, precision and optical instruments. Medium-high-tech 
industries include: electrical machinery and apparatus, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, chemicals 
(excluding pharmaceuticals), railroad equipment and transport equipment, and machinery and equipment.  
 Table 2. Annual GDP per capita Growth (1961-1999) 
 
 1961-
1970 
1971-
1980 
1981-
1990 
1990-
1999 
Average annual 
growth of GDP 
Per Capita 
 
3.37% 
 
 
3.58% 
 
-0.29% 
 
1.42% 
Source: Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderon (2002) 
 
 
This performance becomes more obviously poor when compared with its main trading 
partners and competing countries. Mexico has consistently lagged behind its partners in 
the NAFTA area and major East Asian competitors. Particularly relevant are the 
differences with Korea and China, countries which have exceeded Mexican GDP growth 
by several orders of magnitude during the period (see Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Comparative Annual GDP Growth Rate 
1980-1990 1990-2000
M ex ico 1.1 3.1
U.S . 3.5 3.5
Ca na da 3.3 2.9
Ko rea 8.9 5.7
Ch in a 10 .1 10.3
 Ave rag e  An nu a l  % G ro w th
GDP
 
Source: World Bank, 2002 
 
 
ii. Total Factor Productivity 
 
Several authors have estimated the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) evolution during the 
last twenty years. These estimates have some variation, resulting from differences in 
data sources and estimation techniques. Despite the slight differences, the story seems 
to be quite consistent across different authors: TFP in Mexico declined sharply during 
the 1980s and has remained relatively stagnant during the 1990s (see Figure 3). This 
stagnation is counterintuitive given the great export growth after liberalization. This 
empirical evidence from Mexico (and other countries) also contradicts conventional 
theory which predicts increases in TFP as a consequence of trade liberalization. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of Total Factor Productivity (1980-2000) 
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Source: Bergoeing et al (2002) 
 
Authors account for this stagnation in a variety of ways (see Table 4 for key findings 
from recent references). Some of the main explanations provided are: 1) the lack of 
banking sector law reforms are at least partly responsible for stagnant TFP, (Bergoeing 
et al, 2002), 2) investment has been too low to expand the capital stock, (Bosworth, 
1998), 3) foreign capital participation has a negative impact on TFP, but forward or 
backward linkages to sectors with foreign capital participation have a positive effect, 
(Lopez Cordoba, 2002)  and 4) sharp differences in TFP growth (ranging from –35% in 
basic metal industries to +28.5% in precision instruments) can be observed across 
sectors, so that the observed decline is explained by a composition effect. When 
analyzing labor productivity, the results are also mixed. According to INEGI (2001), 
overall labor productivity in the maquiladora industry decreased in the period from 1988 
to 1998. On the other hand, Lopez-Acevedo (2003) finds significant increases in labor 
productivity, particularly in firms which invest in training.  
 
 
Table 4. Recent References on TFP in Mexico 
 Key findings 
Raphael 
Bergoeing et al 
(2002)  
- TFP in Mexico and Chile dropped during the 1980s, but while output in Chile returned 
to a growth path, it never recovered in Mexico, and two decades later it still is 30% 
below trend. 
- Comparative evidence does not support that this recovery was due to exports or to 
large external debt. 
- The explanation for the difference in economic performances is based on the different 
timing of structural reforms in the two countries. 
- The crucial difference in performance is explained by the reform of banking and 
bankruptcy laws. 
Barry Bosworth 
(1998) 
- Economic collapse of the early 1980s created a persistent disequilibrium situation in 
which large portions of labour are effectively under-employed  
- Direct estimates of appropriate measures of factor income cannot be obtained. 
- After 1988, the growth in output was barely adequate to match the expansion of the 
factor inputs, and there was little or no increase of capital 
- Despite an enormous expansion in foreign borrowing, México has been unable to 
generate an expansion of the capital stock commensurate with the growth in the 
labour force. 
- TFP reflects allocative inefficiencies, as an excess supply of workers is pushed into 
jobs below their normal skills levels since the 1980s 
- Mexico needs ways to smooth the flow of jobs form the informal (low technology) to 
the formal sector 
Pablo Fajinzyber 
and Daniel 
Lederman 
(1995) 
-TFP growth was faster when Mexico was “reformed”, in fact average TFP growth is 
negative in the periods of no reform, due to the fact that recessions have been 
frequent during this period. 
- Observed productivity growth is subject to the effect of short-term fluctuations that can 
obscure the impact of reforms on the long-run economic performance. 
Kristin Hallberg, 
Hong Tan, and 
Leonid 
Koryukin- World 
Bank (2000) 
- For the manufacturing sector as a whole, TFP growth accelerated between 1993 and 
1995, from an annualized growth rate of 0.6% to 13.8%. Subsequently, TFP growth 
rates declined, to 1.3% in 1995-96, and turned negative in 1996-97. 
- Non-exporters have had less TFP growth than exporters during this period. 
- Learning through exporting is taking place. While the immediate productivity gains 
from exporting are modest, sustained productivity gains accrue as experience 
accumulates. Overall, firms learn and improve productivity, through experience and 
exporting, specifically with years of experience as suppliers. 
- Firm-level productivity is improved by investments in worker training and 
implementation of quality control practices. 
Norman Loayza, 
Pablo 
Fajnzylber, and 
César 
Calderón(2002) 
- Strong-market oriented reforms conducted during the 1990’s increased growth in 
Mexico in comparison to the previous decade. 
- Educational attainment has increased in almost every period. 
- Low TFP may be due to the declining efficiency of market organization due to policy 
or other changes. 
- TFP has a more important effect in growth than factor accumulation. 
- Upsurges in growth precede a rise in investment and saving. 
Ernesto López-
Córdoba (2002) 
- Mexico’s total factor productivity performance since the early 1980s and through the 
mid 1990s was rather disappointing, with average annual growth between -1and -2 
percent. 
- Exporting does not have a positive effect on TFP growth. In fact, being an exporter 
appeared to be negatively correlated with productivity growth. 
- In contrast to the strong support for the view that trade competition fosters 
improvements in productivity, there is at best scant evidence showing that improved 
access to more and better intermediate inputs translates into productivity growth 
- Foreign capital participation reduces productivity, but FDI in industries in which a plant 
has backward or forward linkages has a significant and positive effect. 
Gladys López 
Acevedo (2003) 
- Considers only labour productivity. 
- Schooling has a high impact on wages and productivity, a factor that may explain the 
slow growth in labour productivity in Mexico is the low education level. 
- Investment in human capital magnifies technology-driven productivity gains, but 
Mexico has not invested enough. 
- Findings in labour suggest that training obtained outside of firms increase productivity, 
but Mexico has under-invested in training as can be seen with the high percentage of 
in-house training. 
 
 
 
iii. Export Performance 
 
As mentioned in the first section, the brightest spot of the Mexican economy in the last 
ten years has been export performance. The large increase and clear contribution to 
GDP growth suggest that the trade liberalization model was indeed successful. However 
a closer look shows weaknesses within the export structure. 
 
Concentration in few firms: An important limitation comes from the fact that exports are 
extremely concentrated, with few dozens of firms accounting for 90% of manufacturing 
exports. Table 5 presents the 8 largest firms exporting from Mexico (the list does not 
include Maquiladoras4 where other prominent foreign electronic and automotive firms, 
such as Sony and Delphi, that export several billion dollars in goods).  
Table 5. Largest Firms Exporting from Mexico 
F irm Ex po rts
1 P em ex $9,914
2 G eneral M otors  de M ex ico $5,050
3 V olks wagen de  M ex ico $5,040
4 Chrys le r M ex ico $3,792
5 IB M  de M ex ico $3,000
6 Cem ex $2,665
7 F ord M ex ico $2,330
8 Nissan M ex icana $1,586  
Source: America Economía web page5 
 
Exports based on foreign firms: Most of the largest exporters from Mexico are foreign 
owned firms. Table 5 shows that only one of the eight largest exporters is a private 
Mexican firm. Similarly, Table 1 and Figure  2 point to the great increase in both 
automotive and high tech sectors. However, with the exception of a handful of autopart 
firms, these sectors are composed entirely of foreign firms. This excessive reliance on 
foreign firms presents two risks in the medium term. First, foreign companies tend to be 
more willing to shift production capacity in response to changes in relative factor costs, 
creating instability in the labour market. Second, parent companies tend to give priority 
to their own country facilities in issues such as training. For example, labor market 
rigidities in U.S. manufacturing (such as those created by the UAW in the auto industry) 
create the need for constant productivity increases achieved through local training. Thus, 
limited regional training budget reduce the possibilities of increasing skills in Mexico.  
 
Exports as enclave: The concentration of exports in few foreign firms would not 
represent a problem, if they created significant spillover effects through vertical linkages. 
Unfortunately, exporting firms tend to operate largely in isolation from the rest of the 
economy. An example of this “shallow” economic development is the small degree of 
local content integration in Maquiladora industry, which after 40 years of presence in 
Mexico, has recently increased its local input integration to 4%. This small percentage of 
integration has several problems. In the short term, lack of integration means that the 
economic benefits to the region will be limited to wages, without the possibility of the 
multiplier effect resulting from linkages to other parts of the economy. In the medium 
term, lack of linkages will greatly limit the possibility of diffusing knowledge to local firms, 
which might improve capabilities in response to foreign buyer requirements. In terms of 
firm mobility, the absence of local suppliers also decreases the cost of changing 
locations, making industry more footloose.  
 
Extreme dependence on one export market: While exports to the U.S. accounted for 
approximately two thirds of total exports in the early 1990s, this percentage has 
increased steadily for ten years, and exports to the U.S. have stabilized at around 89% 
(See Figure 5). This means that simple comparative advantage, in the form of proximity 
to the world largest has overshadowed the advantage of having trade agreements with 
                                                
4 The reason for excluding Maquiladoras is that their accounting practices usually consider value added 
rather than total export value.  
5 http://www.americaeconomia.com/FilesMC/ranking-SP02.pdf, consulted in June 26, 2003 
31 other countries, many of which also have higher labour costs. As with the case of 
foreign firms, this extreme reliance on one market increases risk, by making exports 
vulnerable to contractions in the U.S. economy.  
 
Figure 4. Exports to U.S. as Percentage of Total Exports 
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The four factors mentioned above (concentration, foreign ownership, few local inputs, 
and extreme dependence on the U.S. market), suggest that increasing exports are more 
a result of international division of labor than of the development of advanced 
capabilities by previously established firms. The proximity to the U.S. and its labor cost 
advantage, created a massive migration of labor intensive manufacturing operations into 
Mexico. A lot of the growth registered in the last fifteen years can be attributed to 
comparative advantages (as opposed to competitive advantage) to its main trading 
partner, the U.S.  This does not rule out operation and process improvements to be able 
to compete in a very open economy, with a diverse manufacturing base.  
 
 
Innovation system in Mexico and its weaknesses 
 
Mexico, as the rest of Latin America, is caught in a low-level equilibrium trap in 
innovation and learning. Despite very significant changes in the macro environment and 
increased competition within the economies, economic agents (particularly firms) have 
not been able to shift towards knowledge-intensive activities with higher value added. 
Figure 6 shows the deviation from predicted investment gap from median R&D/GDP 
relative to its per capita income for a variety of Latin American countries. It shows that, 
with the exception of Argentina in the 1970s and Chile in the early 1980s, investment in 
Latin American countries has been significantly below the median.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. R&D/GDP Relative to its Per Capita Income 
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Even though empirical evidence shows returns to investment in R&D are on average 
higher in emerging economies, Latin American countries have been notorious for their 
meager investment in R&D activities. Maloney (2003) estimates that the optimal amount 
of investment is between 4 and 10 times current amounts, and provides a variety of 
reasons for this underinvestment. Perhaps the most important constraint mentioned is 
the lack of learning capacity, which would allow firms not only to use a technology, but 
also to develop it further. Other reasons provided for the low investment are: lack of 
competitive pressures, absence of well functioning capital markets, limited 
entrepreneurial capital, unstable macro-economic growth and limited access to 
intermediate inputs. All of these factors help explain why the technology gap between 
Latin America and innovating countries has increased, despite a variety of existing 
elements such as trade, abundant foreign direct investment, and significant investment 
in capital goods, which in theory should spur innovation.  
 
Within the world and regional context, Mexico’s indicators of innovative activity are quite 
poor. For example, its investment in R&D as a percentage of GDP is the lowest within 
the OECD. Perhaps more surprisingly, it also is lower than investment in other large 
Latin American countries such as Brazil, Chile and Argentina (See Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Investment in R&D as % of GDP 
(Year 2000, except otherwise indicated) 
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Source: OECD (2001) 
 
 
An additional problem of R&D investment is the low involvement of the private sector. 
Figure 8 shows the financing and execution of R&D by economic sector. We can 
observe that the public sector finances 59.1% of innovation, while the private sector 
accounts for only 24.5%. Similarly, in terms of execution, the private sector performs 
26.3% of R&D activities, with the rest being done by the government, higher education 
institutions (HEIs) and non-profit organization. This situation is in sharp contrast with 
countries such as Germany, Korea, U.S. and Japan, all countries where over 70% of 
total R&D is performed by the private sector, and over 65% of total R&D is financed by 
the private sector.   
 
This distribution reflects both the lack of interest of managers in investing in innovation 
activities and a policy system which has provided an adequate framework for the 
development of science, but not of technological activities. This allocation tends to make 
investment in R&D less relevant for immediate problems and slower in adapting to 
changes in the environment conditions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Finance and Execution of R&D in Mexico 
(By sector, 2000) 
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Source: OECD (2001) 
 
 
 
Using a “systems of innovation” approach, we can identify the presence of a variety of 
elements necessary to generate innovation, including: the research system, large 
export-oriented firms, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), clusters and government 
institutions. Government institutions and policies are explained in the following section, 
while the others are described below. 
 
Research System: Mexico has a public scientific research system which is sizeable in 
terms both of basic research produced and resources spent. According to RAND (2003), 
“The Mexican science base can serve as a significant resource to technology 
development and application within Mexico. The government of Mexico has increased 
R&D spending from 4 billion pesos to 18.5 billion pesos during the 1990s. In an index 
created by RAND to rank countries by S&T capacity, Mexico ranks a respectable 
number 50 among 150 countries.  In an index of technology transfer capabilities, Mexico 
ranked number 4 in 2001.”  
Scientific productivity also shows a strong performance. In terms of publications in 
internationally recognized journals, Mexican scientists have been prolific during the 
1990s in the fields of physics, clinical medicine, biology, biochemical research and 
chemistry. In addition to improving their position in journals, Mexican scientists are also 
increasingly likely to collaborate with international colleagues, showing a global 
awareness of knowledge creation. These indicators provide evidence of world-class 
level research and indicate the potential for knowledge creation within academic 
institutions.  
Despite its relative strength by world standards, research in Mexico is public and supply-
driven, where scientists rarely establish any relationship with industry. This model has 
resulted in research which, although publishable, rarely addresses any clear short or 
long-term need of society or firms. 
 
Large Exporting Firms: The main motor of growth in the last decade, and the key 
indicator of good economic performance from the domestic economy, is the increase in 
exports. Table 4 shows revealed comparative advantages (RCA) of Mexico vis-à-vis its 
NAFTA trading partners. We can notice that the two largest sectors, both in absolute 
terms for 2000, and in terms of increase from 1973 to 2000, are road vehicles and 
telecom equipment, products which can certainly be classified as knowledge industries. 
These sectors are based on large, mostly international, firms competing with world class 
manufacturing systems.  
 
 
 
Table 6. Share in Total Exports of Commodity Groups 
in Which Mexican Strength Is Concentrated, 1993-2000 (%) 
 1993 2000 
Mexico has comparative 
advantage 
vegetables and fruit 
3.6 2.0 
Petroleum 13.7 9.0 
Manufactures of metals 2.5 2.4 
telecom equipment 8.9 11.6 
road vehicles 13.6 17.0 
Furniture 1.3 2.0 
Clothing 2.3 5.2 
Both countries are strong 
power-generating machinery 
4.9 3.8 
office machines and ADP 
equipment 
2.9 7.1 
electrical machinery 16.0 15.8 
Source: RAND (2003) 
 
Although these firms certainly have become able competitors in the regional markets, 
they rarely carry out product and process innovation. Most domestic firms rely heavily on 
technology licenses or other types of assistance from foreign companies, rather than 
developing their own technology. Multinationals rely on their parent companies for most 
R&D activities. Given that their role is mostly as manufacturing facilities, export-oriented 
MNCs and larger domestic firms, concentrate their innovation efforts into organizational 
and marketing activities, rather than product and process technology.  
 
Even though lack of innovation is the general rule, some firms have been shown it is 
possible to be innovative within the context. One example is Delphi Engineering Center, 
member of Delphi Automotive Group, the largest automotive parts firm in the world. Like 
most other large, US-based automotive firms, Delphi established several plants in 
northern Mexico during the mid-80s, using the country as a base for labor intensive 
manufacturing operations.  
 
In 1995 Delphi took a giant step forward by establishing an engineering center in Ciudad 
Juarez. This center is primarily involved in doing research, design and development 
activities for the corporation. While the average Delphi engineering center in the U.S. 
employs 500 people, the Juarez facility employed 860 by 1995, and currently employs 
over 1000, most of them Mexican engineers. According to Carrillo and Hualde (1996), 
the firm cut development costs by 60% and delivery time by 20% during the first year of 
operation. This extraordinary performance has continued. During 2002, the center 
developed 50 inventions, which received intellectual property protection (35 patents, 14 
defensive publications and 3 industrial secrets). While assembly maquilas have reacted 
to the strong peso by decreasing their labor force in the past two years, Delphi 
Engineering has maintained its employment level, and other automotive firms such as 
GM and Visteon are creating or expanding their engineering facilities in the country, at 
least partly following Delphi`s success.  
 
 
SMEs and Clusters: The rest of the firms, the 98.9% of small and micro enterprises (and 
many of the medium firms) are, with few exceptions, in a weak competitive position. 
Rather than focusing on innovation, firms have been focusing on surviving and adapting 
themselves to a variety of on-going changes in the past decades. These changes 
include: increased competition as a result of NAFTA, a severe contraction of the 
economy in 1995 (with GDP growth of –6.4%), virtually no financing for investment or 
working capital for and a strengthened peso in the last four years. Many thousands of 
firms have disappeared as a consequence of these changes, while surviving firms spend 
most of their innovation efforts taking reactive measures against changes in the 
macroeconomic environment, and limiting their growth to retained profits.  
 
SMEs certainly have important innovation potential, if for nothing else, because of the 
sheer number of possible agents that can try new products and processes. This potential 
has not been realized, at least partly because of the environmental instability requiring 
constant adaptation. This potential could be substantially increased if firms could 
integrate into well articulated clusters. 
 
In successful cases, firms within clusters have frequently evoke images of Silicon Valley 
or Route 128, with pockets of highly innovative firms interacting to create innovation. In 
the case of Mexico, one finds that the phenomenon of clustering of economic activity 
seems to take place in a completely different sense.  Perhaps the most noticeable 
clusters can be found in traditional handicraft industries: silver in Taxco, majolica 
ceramics in Puebla and Tonalá or fine embroidery in Patzcuaro are just some examples 
of specialized, geographically concentrated economic activity with constant interaction. 
One positive aspect of these clusters, is that they are “knowledge based”, in the sense 
that it is not a particular natural resource advantage which has kept them alive, but 
rather a combination of agglomeration factors including: support services, specialized 
educational institutions, design facilities and sophisticated market knowledge. Taxco is 
an interesting example of the power of the clustering phenomenon. A major silver mine 
was found in Taxco in the 16th century, and soon thereafter, silversmiths followed. By the 
time when the mine was depleted in the mid-20th century, Taxco had a variety of 
specialized suppliers, educational institutions and markets around several hundred 
families working around the area. Currently, Taxco still produces a large percentage of 
hand-made silver products, despite the fact that silver production facilities are 
concentrated in Coahuila.   
 
Trying to find more technology intensive cases, perhaps the best example of a cluster in 
Mexico is the city of Monterrey. Monterrey is located in a barren land, with scarce natural 
resources and a very extreme climate. The city is not a cluster in a traditional sense, for 
it is an agglomeration of a variety of industries (particularly branches of metalmechanical, 
chemical, ceramics) rather than one industry. This has generated urbanization 
economies which contribute to the welfare of the region. The state of Nuevo Leon has 
8.7% of manufacturing output, with only 3.7% of total national population. From 1993, 
the state has increased its share of domestic GDP, from 6.4% to 6.9%, In terms of GDP 
per capita, it has gone from 4th place in 1995 to 2nd place in 2000. Manufacturing activity 
index is 141.3 compared with national 123.7. It has 9.9% of commercial bank receipts.  
 
Besides the presence of many multinational corporations, a significant part of production 
is done by large multi-industry conglomerates. FEMSA (beverages and retailing), AXA 
(chemicals metal, autoparts, food), Proeza (food and automotive), Vitro (Glass), Cydsa 
(Chemical, textiles), Pulsar (biotech, financial), Alfa (chemical, food, autoparts) Imsa 
(steel, batteries) and CEMEX. These industrial groups bought two of the largest national 
banks (Bancomer, Banorte) so that the city is currently increasing its importance as a 
financial center.  
 
Human resources for industry are trained in 19 universities, of which the largest is the 
Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (Tec). Tec was originally 
formed by Alfa, Vitro and other leading industrial groups, with the purpose of forming 
high quality engineers for their firms. It remains a leading institution in the country, which, 
following its origins, keeps close contracts with industry. One of the key functions of Tec 
has been providing an environment where local firms, government and researchers can 
discuss the future of the region. This has resulted in a shared vision, with all the 
economic agents working towards becoming a center for high tech manufacturing and 
services. 
 
Another, more sofisticated case, is the case of electronics in Jalisco. Central Jalisco has 
been called euphemistically the “Latin American Silicon Valley”. Two years ago, the list 
of international companies with manufacturing facilities was quite impressive: IBM, 
Hewlett-Packard, NEC, Motorola, Intel, Siemens, Flextronics, Jabil Circuits, USI (these 
three from Korea, Singapore and Taiwan respectively). According to Secretaria de 
Economia, Jalisco´s production accounts for 35% of production for the largest Contract 
Electronic Manufacturers, and the value added within the region is 27%. This would 
certainly suggest clustering of high value added activity.  
 
Unfortunately, the story has changed dramatically in the last two years. Firms such as 
IBM and Motorola, plus many other smaller ones, have pulled their manufacturing out of 
the region, taking it to China and other Asian countries. When asked why they were 
moving, one of the major firms provided three reasons: China´s accessibility to the 
global market (while Mexico deals almost exclusively with the North American Market); 
the presence of most component suppliers in Asia (proximity to suppliers increases the 
responsiveness of the supply chain); and lower labour costs.  
 
Even though Central Jalisco´s position as a successful electronics cluster is now being 
questioned, the region still has a significant concentration of talent and knowledge in this 
industry. The state government and local organizations are doing significant efforts to 
convert the low-value added assembly jobs into higher value added software 
development jobs. There are some examples which show that there is a good possibility 
of making such a transition. IBM currently runs a Guadalajara Development Lab, which 
works on developing AS/400 and Server applications. This facility is one of the few 
companies in Mexico to have a CMM 3 certification. A successful conversion into 
software would not only re-vitalize the cluster, but also provide higher value-added, 
better paying jobs. 
 
 
 
 
From the above descriptions, we can see that the first two elements, (science culture 
and export pragmatism) are relatively strong, in the sense that they have pockets of 
world-class quality, large institutions, with a size large enough to reap the advantages of 
scale economy. These agents could easily be inserted in a global innovation system. 
Nevertheless, these elements have not had the incentives to become innovative. 
However, small firms and clusters are quite weak. 
 
Another major problem is the isolation of the different elements. Despite their relative 
strength and size, large firms are disconnected, in that the different elements hardly 
interact with each other, and interaction is small even within elements of the same 
system. This lack of interaction can be seen in a variety of ways: few collaborations 
between industry and academia, small degree of local content in exporting firms, limited 
number of industry consortia among others. Creating these linkages would be at least as 
important as strengthening the individual elements. 
 
 
Industrial development and innovation policies 
 
It has been widely recognized that under market conditions, investment in technology 
and innovation tends to be suboptimal. One of the main reasons is that the social return 
tends to be higher than the private return, so that firms then to underinvest in innovation 
activities. Though intellectual property law contributes to correct this distortion, the 
government can play an active role supporting innovation activities to bring investment 
closer to optimal amounts.  
 
The current section describes programs related to innovation activities. In order to make 
a complete analysis, and take a broader definition of innovation, it considers institutions 
dealing with both technological development activities and with enterprise support 
programs. The section will first describe traditional innovation and enterprise support 
programs, which largely function totally independent from each other, and then the new 
technology programs, where innovation and enterprise support tend to converge. 
 
Public sector innovation support organizations: 
 
One of the key weaknesses of the Mexican Innovation System is that innovation is takes 
place mostly in the public sector, and also geographically centralized. As mentioned 
previously, innovation takes place mostly within public sector institutions, funded by 
public sector institutions. Research takes place, particularly public universities, and 
particularly UNAM and Politecnico (both located in Mexico City), which account for 80%. 
By contrast, the center of manufacturing has been slowly moving north towards the 
border 
 
Research in Mexico has traditionally been supply-driven with scientists submitting 
proposals to get research grants. Rewards, particularly for researchers within public 
universities, have been mostly tied to published papers. Joint work with industry has 
traditionally been penalized by the conservative scientific community. The country has 
relative scientific strength in fields such as biotechnology, astrophysics and mathematics. 
But, who are generally the clients for these innovations? Frequently, the answer is 
nobody. In other cases, the answer is the public sector. This model has resulted in 
research which does not necessarily solve any clear short or long-term needs of society. 
 
Table 5 shows the largest receivers of federal R&D resources in the country. We can 
observe that education and energy account for 85% of total expenditure. Within this 
environment a few institutions have seen the advantages of cooperating with production 
agents. Several public institutions participate in R&D related activities. As shown in 
Table 5 in the previous section, education concentrates the largest share of resources 
related to R&D, with 62.4% of total, followed by energy with 22.4% of total. Most of these 
resources are focused on doing basic research.  
 
 
 
Table 5. Main Sectors of Federal R&D Expenditure 
Percentage of Total (2001) 
Main Sectors Main Subsectors 
(as percentage of Sector)* 
 
 
Education (62.4%) 
 
 
Of which: 
UNAM 27% 
Conacyt 23.8% 
SEP-Conacyt 22% 
Cinvestav 6.8% 
 
Energy (22.4%) 
 
 
Of which: 
IMP   52.4% 
Pemex   32.4% 
Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas   8.3% 
Instituto de Investigaciones Nucleares   6.9%  
 
Others (15.2%) 
 
Of which: 
Agriculture and rural   49.3% 
Health and social security   19.7% 
*Includes main subsectors only, so does not necessarily add 100%. 
 
 
 
A good example of public research centers of excellence, with little social impact, is the 
IMP (Mexican Petroleum Institute), the largest research institution in the energy sector. 
IMP is an important generator of academic publications, with 630 papers published 
between 1981 and 2000. Between 1996 and 2001, the IMP requested 96 patents, the 
largest number filed by any Mexican institution.  
 
Despite this impressive academic output of the innovation is done for basically a single 
client: PEMEX, the state-owned oil monopoly. The number of patents is significant when 
compared with other domestic agents. However it is small compared with the largest 
foreign requestor for Mexican patents, with 2615 patents requested in a similar period. 
The impact of IMP on Mexican society would be greatly enhanced with an increased 
participation of the private sector in energy. 
 
 
Enterprise support programs: The complement of the research infrastructure is the large 
variety of programs focused on enterprise support. Table 7 shows a count of the Federal 
Enterprise Support programs. We can observe the wide variety of enterprise support 
programs existing in 2003. There are 98 “legacy” programs from 11 different institutions 
(inherited from the previous administration), plus an additional 31 new (not including 20 
additional ones on institution attributes and databases). In addition to federal programs, 
there are state and local level programs. For example, Aguascalientes, one of the more 
active states in terms of enterprise support programs, has 53 support programs dealing 
with similar issues. In total, there are over 400 federal and state enterprise support 
programs.  
 
 
Table 7. Number of Federal Enterprise Support Programs 
by Type and Organization (2003) 
 Fiscal Information TTAC Credit Supply 
Chain 
New 
programs 
Bancomext  4 5 11  4 
CONACYT   3 3  3 
Economia 5 2 6 1 5 21 
NAFIN  3 2 14  1 
SAGARPA  1 3    
SEDESOL    4   
SEMARNAT 2  2 3   
Other SHCP 
14 
 STPS 1, 
SEP 4 
  SECTUR 
2 
Source: List of Federal Programs 
Notes: TTAC refers to Training, Technical Assistance and Consulting. Credit combines the categories 
Credits, Risk Capital and Subsidies with Development Bank Financing. The new CONACYT programs 
(Fondos Sectoriales, Fondos Mixtos, Avance) were included, though they did not appear in the original 
source.  
 
Even though the budget is centrally approved by the Federal Congress, which in theory 
should evaluate trade-offs in the use of total resources, there is virtually no coordination 
among programs. Design of these programs is the responsibility of its managing 
Secretaria. Each program has its own budget, infrastructure and human resources, and 
several have overlapping objectives. 
When trying to analyze the relation between enterprise support programs and 
technology, we see that few of the programs are directly related to technical innovation. 
Nevertheless, many of the programs do have an indirect impact on technological 
capabilities, as they are geared toward upgrading the quality of inputs for production. For 
example, all of the programs related to training are important in building human capital 
either for general tasks (like Economias Promode which focuses on general 
management knowledge for SMEs) or more industry-specific knowledge (such as SEP 
and STPS Competencias program which develops competencies for specific positions 
within industries). Similarly, a number of NAFIN and Bancomext programs help in 
acquiring machinery and equipment. 
 
 
 
New Technology programs 
 Traditionally, programs directly targeted toward technological improvement have been 
rare, and have lacked continuity. For example, the Programa de Modernizacion 
Tecnológica supported new projects for only two years. This program has ben replaced 
by the Fondo Sectorial of Secretaria de Economia and Conacyt (National Council of 
Science and Technology), and by AVANCE (both described below). Nevertheless, we 
can see that new Economia and Conacyt programs are trying to create programs which 
combine elements of enterprise with innovation, (Figure 5). Such programs Asesores 
Tecnologicos Empresariales (ATE) and Consultoria Especializada en Tecnologia from 
Economia, and Fondos and Avance from Conacyt. 
 
 
Figure 5. Convergence of Enterprise Support 
and Innovation Programs 
 
 
 
 
Of particular relevance for firm innovation are the new Conacyt programs of Fondos 
Sectoriales, Fondos Mixtos and Avance. With these programs, Conacyt is taking 
advantage of its experience in evaluation of science and technology projects, to 
generate projects which are relevant to solve specific problems. These programs are 
described below 
 
l Fondos Sectoriales are funds created with matching funds from Conacyt and 
different ministries. Each of the ministries defines a set of priorities which need to be 
researched and emits a request for proposals by scientific institutions. The funds that 
are currently operating are: Semarnat (environment), Sagarpa (agriculture and rural), 
Semar (marine), Sedesol (social development), Economia (mostly for private 
development projects), Conafovi (housing), Conafor (forestry), Salud (health), SEP 
(education), Sener (energy), SCT (communications), Segob (government) and Asa 
(Airports). The total capital of the funds is over $1,2 billion pesos, of which roughly 
half has been contributed by Conacyt, and the other half by the ministries. These 
funds replace the traditional Science Support program, which used to support 
research projects. Research for pure science is now supported by the SEP-Conacyt 
sectoral fund. 
 
l Fondos Mixtos are a similar scheme, but are joint funds with a Mexican state, instead 
of a ministry, where each state defines a set of topics to be researched. Of the 32 
state governments (including the Federal District), 25 have a fund operating, and a 
vast majority have already selected its first set of projects. The speed of formation of 
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the 25 centers, shows the growing awareness of the importance of Science and 
Technology at the state level. These funds have the additional advantage of 
promoting descentralization of research. Traditionally, most of Conacyt`s resources 
have stayed in Mexico City, and specifically UNAM and IPN. For example, 48.6% of 
SNI support are going to Mexico City institutions; concentration is even more 
dramatic if we consider only level II (60.9%) and level III (71.6%). Fondos Sectoriales 
will naturally tend to disperse funds  
 
l Programa Avance (Alto Valor Agregado en Negocios con Conocimiento y 
Empresarios): The objective of the program is providing “last mile” financing which 
helps translate scientific and technological developments into product, processes 
and services with market potential. The types of activities being supported include: 
construction and test of the last round of prototypes, market tests, development of 
basic engineering of product and process, and expenses related to patent 
registration. The concept behind the program is that there are virtually no success 
stories of innovations in Mexico going from the lab to the marketplace. This program 
intends to provide a critical mass of demonstration cases which should spur 
innovation at a wider level.  
 
These programs clearly show that Conacyt is trying to make science more relevant to 
industry. In terms of players, what Conacyt is doing with Fondos Sectoriales and Mixtos 
is important in two ways. On the one hand, it is putting itself in the center of every 
institution, so that in fact it can coordinate the variety of agendas. By being in the center 
of all the Fondos, it can avoid the danger of creating a multitude of uncoordinated ad hoc 
efforts. On the other hand, the Fondos allow Conacyt to leverage its resources, by 
providing matching funds for resource contributed.  
 
It is a significant achievement that Conacyt was able to assemble so many Fondos in 
less than three years, particularly considering the significant contributions from the 
counterparts. This certainly suggests a strong leadership from Conacyt side, and a clear 
perception by the counterparts of the need to deepen the knowledge on their respective 
areas.  
 
Their novelty and the quick speed of design and implementation have meant that the 
attitude is “learning by doing”.  Even though some of the Fondos Sectoriales and Mixtos 
are experienced some operational problems at the start, the concept of creating funds 
which respond to needs of a specific sector or state are a great step forward. According 
to the people using the funds, there are some weaknesses, such as finding evaluators 
who understand the academic rigor of research and the relevance of the proposal to 
solve specific problems. Unfortunately, people with both of these skills are very hard to 
find. Programs such as environment and health, where there is a strong tradition of 
scientific research in Mexico, are being evaluated by scientists on these fields, using 
traditional science criteria such as papers published previously, and papers to be 
published, which certainly are not sufficient criteria to guarantee the relevance or 
applicability.  
 
 
 
 
In summary, there are a large variety of programs from ministries and states. Even 
though there is no formal evaluation, industry performance indicators have not improved 
dramatically, suggesting that so many programs are really uncoordinated efforts by 
different institutions, resulting in significant inefficiencies. Even though every federal 
program in theory needs to be evaluated every year to receive federal budget, 
evaluation is practically non-existant. Given the absence of clear metrics, there are no 
criteria by which programs should be evaluated.   
 
Traditionally, programs have not focused on innovation, though several have impacted 
the quality of labor and equipment. Conacyt`s new programs are shifting away from pure 
research, towards applied researchand firm support. It is critical to create a top-down 
effort to coordinate all these legacy programs, and concentrate in fewer, more effective 
and efficient programs.  Better evaluation, which could be translated into design and 
operational improvements, could really help transform the science system from supply to 
demand based. 
 
 
 
Recommendations on how to strengthen innovation system 
 
Economic development policy of the past decade has largely been based on the signing 
of trade agreements, resulting in agreements with 32 countries. From the perspective of 
domestic firms, these agreements have had a double effect: on the upside, they have 
permitted access to hundreds of millions of customers in potential market, where they 
can offer their products and services. On the downside, they have presented an 
exponential increase in domestic competition, particularly in manufacturing products. 
Unfortunately, the majority of domestic firms have not been able to adapt to the new 
competitive conditions, particularly with the low growth and financing shortage which has 
prevailed in Mexico for the last ten years.  
Despite the disadvantages, growth during the past ten years has largely been a result of 
firms (mostly foreign) taking advantage of NAFTA, by using Mexico as an export base. 
As Mexico has been losing its preferential trade status vis-a-vis other low labor cost 
countries, many of the firms, particularly in the electronics and garment sectors, have 
migrated to lower cost countries.  NAFTA provided a one-time bonus for attracting firms 
which wanted to export. It is quite possible that Mexico has extracted most of the 
advantages of NAFTA in its first eight years. 
 
From a knowledge and innovation perspective, Mexico can be characterized by the clear 
presence of a dual economy; on the one hand, dynamic strong economic agents which 
have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by NAFTA; on the other, weak 
agents (and states) which have not  taken advantage of these opportunities and are 
stagnant. This presents plenty of opportunities for the weak to catch up with the strong. 
 
Now it is necessary to create new policy framework. The Post-NAFTA agenda is largely 
about concerted private-public effort of transformation from low to higher equilibrium. 
Industry has suffered a severe shake-up with many thousands of firms disappearing. 
Those firms which have survived the last ten years with increasing competition, recurrent 
crisis, slow growth rate and limited availability of credit, unstable macroeconomic 
conditions, have shown a large resourcefulness for survival. For many years, firms tried 
to resist competition not through increased competitiveness or innovation, but by trying 
create pressure on the government to close the borders. Survivors now understand that 
trade liberalization and increased competition are here to stay, and that they need to 
adapt to this new situation.  
 
What will Mexican industry look like twenty years from now? A question difficult to 
answer, justas it was difficult to predict Mexico’s current industrial structure in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1982 debt-crisis. Policy response to the debt crisis was a 
turning point which culminated in NAFTA. Now Mexico once again is in the turning point 
and the issue is transition to from narrow integration with us (based mainly in labor cost 
advantages) to knowledge-based integration.  
 
The previous sections have shown that Mexico is caught in a low-level trap. However, 
this is by no means an inescapable one. It is worth noticing that many countries have 
been able to escape these traps and that there is no unique way of leaping into a higher 
level equilibrium. Different countries have found ways to build on their strength to 
improve their competitive position. Perhaps the country which best illustrates this 
upgrading Korea, which used a model of growth based largely on diversified 
conglomerates. These conglomerates took advantage of its protected domestic market 
which allowed to generate surplus capital for investment. At the same time they started 
investing in industries where the minimum efficient scale was the global market, such as 
shipbuilding or microchips. This private strategy was complemented with an excellent 
education system. When the domestic market was open, these firms were world-class 
companies with significant technological capabilities.  
 
Mexico shares many elements with Korea and has additionally a variety of factors to be 
considered on creating the new advantage. There will soon be a demographic bonus, 
which results from the bottom of the population pyramid starting to shrink. This means 
that the proportion of people in working age is going to peak in the next few years, 
providing an opportunity of creating wealth. The possibility of foreign firms using Mexico 
as a base for knowledge activities is currently limited, basically because the supply of 
high-quality, high-skilled workers, is likely to remain limited in the years to come. Few 
firms have the individual scale to be leaders in innovation, one has to take advantage 
that the size of the overall economy, large by world standards. Another advantage is the 
integration with the North American market in production. It is key that this integration in 
production is extended to integration in knowledge creating activities both by 
academicians and industry.  Local firms need to find niches where distance (not 
transport cost) is a critical factor. Such products would include inputs which need to be 
used in a just-in-time fashion in the North American region.  
 
Mexico needs a dynamic and flexible innovation system. The leadership of the 
private sector in innovation, is a necessary condition for a real transition into the higher 
value added production of goods and services. The danger of not developing the system 
is to continue being squeezed between lower-cost and high-value-added producing 
countries. A first step to establish this common vision and discourse would be involving 
major private and public players into a technology foresight process. This would help 
build shared vision of Mexico as a knowledge economy: Private-sector led technology 
foresight process. On the basis of successful private-sector driven projects and a joint 
vision, proceed to more substantial commitments.  
 
At the first stage, this means shooting for a substantial increase in added value. This 
vision makes the private sector the CENTER for innovative activity, with strong 
capabilities within, and being able to draw from support institutions such as research 
centers, universities, and other government programs. Move innovative activity from 
public to private, by instead of subsidizing research activities in universities, being sure 
that more of these are relevant for productive activities. This new system has five 
elements, each one playing an ideal role6: 
 
1. Larger firms, as powerful engines of innovation with clear technology strategies. 
Innovation will be long term activity, carried out at all levels of the organization, to which 
firms dedicate resources. Larger firms would understand the importance of technology, 
what their core technologies are and would constantly promote innovative activities 
throughout the organization. In the process of developing their core capabilities, they 
would generate demand for technological activity from other elements of the system, 
actively seeking collaboration with research centers, universities and foreign partners. 
Firms have taken important strides at improving process performance, in order to be 
cost competitive, but they would have to step one more step to become innovative. 
 
2. Smaller firms, effectively integrated into clusters (horizontal) and supply chains 
(vertical), taking advantage of club goods, which collectively give them economies of 
scale and increased competitiveness.   In terms of clustering strategies, it is critical to 
create local and sector specific strategies which include both the public and private 
sectors. Articulate dynamic public-private innovation community.  
 
3. Government supporting R&D projects through grants, and providing the incentives for 
innovation and cooperation. Traditionally the government has had disparate policies for 
manufacturing and science. Enterprise support programs have concentrated on 
developing basic competencies such as quality control, playing a key role in the 
upgrading of competitive capabilities through some successful programs (CIMO, Cetro, 
Compite, Conocer, supplier development). From the science and technology side, 
Conacyt has traditionally been very strong in supporting science and has been trying 
(though unsuccessfully) to start pushing the innovation agenda at least for the last 8 
years. The government is meeting the challenge by trying to change the programs in two 
ways. The new Fondos Mixtos, Fondos Sectoriales and programs for the development of 
high-value- added technology-based products. This means both trying to make research 
more related to real problems for certain sectors and regions, and allocating funds 
created specifically for the promotion of technology intensive products in existing and 
new firms. The sectoral and regional fondos provide resource-rich programs for 
promoting demand driven R&D. They have created great output expectations, now not 
only in Conacyt, but also in the partnering organizations (states, other Secretarias), and 
so they definitely are politically in the spotlight.  
 
Traditional programs have resulted in reasonable strength in manufacturing performance 
and in science, but very weak linkages between the two. New programs linking both 
activities would include: tax rebates for SMEs undertaking technological efforts with 
some results, actively supporting a constituency which understands and promotes 
issues related with technological development, a totally new SNI (Sistema Nacional de 
Investigadores) which takes into consideration not only published papers, but also 
technology projects to solve specific industry problems. It is important noticing that in 
terms of number of programs, more is not necessarily better. Even though STPS runs 
only one program by itself (CIMO), plus Competencias Laborales in coordination with 
SEP, CIMO has the reputation of being one of the best programs.  
                                                
6 These were oringinally suggested by Yevgeny Kuznetsov of the World Bank 
 
4.Traditionally strong science institutions (HEIs, SEP-Conacyt) actively 
linking/responding to the needs of the private innovators. This would mean a radical 
overhauling of incentives at universities and research organizations to encourage 
linkages with private sector. From the innovation perspective, evaluation of technology 
programs should take into account factors beyond cost-benefit analysis. Ideally, the 
evaluation would include other types of metrics which incorporate how its projects are 
creating linkages within the system. Such metrics would include: involvement by private 
demand and responsive to private sector needs; strong academic-industry linkages; a 
significant percentage of public centers research budgets should be devoted to; insertion 
into international knowledge networks (e.g. through a network of Mexican expatriates in 
the US); and continuous evaluation and monitoring.  
 
5. An effective financing system, particularly in the earlier stages (VC, angels). Though 
this topic is not explored in the current paper, a major constraint to economic 
development in Mexico has been the financial system. This weakness exists for all 
stages of financing: from almost inexistent early stage financing from venture capitalists 
and angel investors, to a passive banking system which rarely promotes growth projects 
and finally a stock market where the number of firms has remained practically constant 
for the last ten years. Obsolete financial regulation and enforcement is partly to blame.  
 
Strengthening these five agents would provide solid building blocks on which innovation 
could …. Playing on the strengths… 
 
Several lines of enquiry follow naturally from the results presented in this paper. Perhaps 
the more interesting ones have to do with the concept of national system of innovation 
as understood by the OECD, and its applicability to less developed nations. A first line 
would question whether the traditional innovation indicators (e.g. investment in R&D as a 
percentage of GDP) are applicable to countries dealing with more basic capacities 
upgrading, or whether a more suitable set of indicators needs to be created(e.g. 
adoption of a certain innovative technology). Second, it would be important to 
understand the role of innovation and tacit knowledge in traditional industries, such as 
crafts, and find what would be the key institutions for its system of innovation. Finally, it 
is interesting to ask in a broader sense whether the traditional definition of national 
innovation system is applicable in countries where differences in capabilities of diverse 
agents (domestic vs. international, large vs. small), make it dificu.  
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